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Abstract: Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may 
be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but argues that its fundamental 
cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and 
nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular 
thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like 
conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.  
 
In section 4 of the target article, Carruthers suggests that auditory images of 
natural language sentences (‘inner speech’) are the vehicles of conscious 
propositional thinking, tentatively endorsing proposals by Dennett and myself 
(Dennett 1991; Frankish 1998a; 1998b; forthcoming). He goes on, however, to 
argue that natural language has a more fundamental cognitive role as the 
medium of cross-modular thinking. Now, of course, the former thesis already 
involves a partial commitment to the latter. If conscious propositional thinking 
occurs in inner speech, then conscious cross-modular propositional thinking will 
do so too. However, Carruthers claims that we also entertain nonconscious cross-
modular thoughts (sect. 5.1), which take the form of logical form (LF) 
representations rather than auditory images, and which are fed directly to 
systems that take cross-modular inputs. This claim is, I think, a more 
contentious one and I want to question whether there is any basis for it.  
 Is there any evidence for the existence of nonconscious cross-modular 
thinking? There is little or no behavioural evidence for it, I think. It is true that 
we are capable of performing some fairly demanding tasks nonconsciously – 
driving, for example, or walking down a busy street. But while these tasks may 
draw on outputs from more than one central module, it is doubtful that they 
require integration of them into cross-modular thoughts. The activities we can 
perform nonconsciously are typically routine ones, requiring precise 
behavioural control rather than creative thinking, and are not significantly 
more demanding than ones that other mammals can be trained to perform. 
Tasks requiring creative intelligence, however, quickly evoke conscious 
thought.  
 Rather more promising evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking 
is provided by what we may call eureka thoughts – episodes in which the 
                                                 
∗  This is an e-print of a comment on ‘The cognitive functions of language’ by Peter 
Carruthers, both published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2002) 25:6 (target article pp. 657-74, 
comment pp. 685-6). It may differ in minor ways from the print version. 
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solution to a problem pops into one’s head some time after one has ceased to 
think about it consciously (Carruthers 2000, chap.3). Such thoughts frequently 
involve conjoining ideas in new ways, and it is tempting to conclude that they 
must be the product of nonconscious cross-modular reasoning. Of course, if 
Carruthers is right, such thoughts cannot be initially framed as a result of cross-
modular reasoning, because by hypothesis they are constructed by the speech 
production system mechanically combining outputs from discrete central 
modules (sect. 6.1). But – Carruthers may say – it is likely that they have 
undergone nonconscious filtering before issuing in inner speech. Cross-modular 
thoughts might be routinely passed to the abductive reasoning faculty for 
evaluation, with only the most promising ones eventually emerging in inner 
speech. There is another possibility, however. This is that cross-modular 
thoughts are fed directly into inner speech without filtering, and that their 
evaluation takes place subsequently, as the agent ‘hears’ and reacts to them. On 
this view, eureka thoughts are special, not because they have been preselected 
for significance, but because we recognize them as important and hold on to 
them, whereas others are forgotten. This view is, I suggest, more consistent 
with the introspective data than the alternative. After all, a great deal of inner 
speech is simply nonsense – whims, fancies, and absurd ideas, which are 
instantly dismissed. Again, then, there is no compelling evidence for 
nonconscious cross-modular thinking – rather the opposite, in fact.  
 Could we elicit experimental data that would bear on the issue? What 
would be needed is something like a version of the Hermer and Spelke 
reorientation task in which subjects were distracted from thinking consciously 
about what they are doing. It is hard to see how this could be arranged, 
however. It might be suggested that we could seek the assistance of 
blindsighted patients – presenting them with geometric and colour information 
in their blind field and seeing if they could integrate it. But again is hard to see 
how we could test for integration of the information without stimulating the 
subjects to conscious thought. (Remember that blindsighted patients do not 
react to blind-field stimuli unless overtly prompted to do so.)  
 This is not conclusive, of course, and it may be that evidence for 
nonconscious cross-modular thinking will emerge. Even if it does, however, 
this would not in itself show that cross-modular thoughts can be tokened as 
LF representations as well as auditory images. For it may be that auditory 
images can themselves be nonconscious. It is plausible to think that episodes 
of inner speech can be unattended, and on some theories of consciousness this 
will be sufficient for them to be nonconscious. Nonconscious inner speech 
might nonetheless be cognitively effective – being processed by the 
comprehension system and made available to conceptual modules and domain-
general systems.  
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 I have argued that there is no evidence for the existence of cross-modular 
thinking in any form other than inner speech. I now want to outline a positive 
reason for thinking that it always takes that form. It is widely accepted that 
there is a feedback loop within the language faculty, which takes phonological 
representations from the speech production system and passes them to the 
speech comprehension system, bypassing the articulatory and auditory systems 
(Dennett 1991; Levelt 1989). It is this loop that supports inner speech. But if 
nonconscious cross-modular thinking occurs, then – assuming Carruthers is 
right about its language dependency – there must be additional feedback loops, 
which take LF representations as input and feed them back to domain-general 
consumer systems, such as the abductive reasoning faculty.1 But why should 
such loops have developed in addition to the phonological one? After all, 
contents entering the phonological loop would also reach domain-general 
consumer systems via the speech comprehension system – and would in 
addition be available to other processes operating specifically on conscious 
thoughts (see sects. 4 and 6.3). Given this, what selectional pressure would 
there have been to develop additional loops channelling bare LF 
representations? They might have been marginally faster, but that is all. (Note 
that it is unlikely that such loops could have developed before the phonological 
one; both would have had to develop at much the same time, subsequent to 
the emergence of language.) The more economical hypothesis is surely that 
there is just one feedback loop from the language system – the one which 
carries auditory images in inner speech – and that it is the channel for both 
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1  In fact, it is doubtful that LF representations could be channelled directly to an abductive 
reasoning faculty in the way Carruthers suggests. It seems likely that such a faculty would 
operate on mental models rather than propositional representations. 
